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a b s t r a c t 
This paper proposes the first user-independent inter-keystroke timing attacks on PINs. Our 
attack method is based on an inter-keystroke timing dictionary built from a human cognitive 
model whose parameters can be determined by a small amount of training data on any 
users (not necessarily the target victims). Our attacks can thus be potentially launched on a 
large scale in real-world settings. We investigate inter-keystroke timing attacks in different 
online attack settings and evaluate their performance on PINs at different strength levels. 
Our experimental results show that the proposed attack performs significantly better than 
random guessing attacks. We further demonstrate that our attacks pose a serious threat to 
real-world applications and propose various ways to mitigate the threat. 
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
Inter-keystroke timing attacks, which make use of the leaked 
keystroke timing information to infer a user’s PIN, pose a se- 
rious threat to real-world applications, especially for online 
financial services whose authentication systems are based 
on PINs. Such attacks have triggered increasing interests in 
recent years due to the development of many practical ap- 
proaches to obtaining users’ keystroke timing information via 
different side channels, including CPU cache ( Gruss et al., 
2016; 2015; Lipp et al., 2016; Oren et al., 2015; Pessl et al., 2016 ), 
shared event loops ( Vila and Köpf, 2017 ), I/O interrupts ( Diao 
et al., 2016; Lipp et al., 2017; Zhang and Wang, 2009 ), and SSH 
( Song et al., 2001 ). Some approaches do not even require at- 
tackers to be physically close to victims or install malware 
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on victims’ devices, which significantly lowers the barrier for 
launching inter-keystroke timing attacks in real-world scenar- 
ios. 
Most of the existing inter-keystroke timing attacks on PINs 
or passwords are user-dependent. Since the seminal work 
published by Song et al. (2001) , the Hidden Markov Model 
(HMM) has been exploited as a major technique to launch the 
inter-keystroke timing attacks ( Kune and Kim, 2010; Zhang 
and Wang, 2009 ). However, HMM is user-specific in a sense 
that it relies on the distribution of inter-keystroke times of a 
specific user typing each possible key pair (which represents 
a hidden state in HMM) so as to infer the user’s PIN from the 
user’s inter-keystroke timing information about a PIN entry. In 
other words, HMM requires that a sufficiently large amount of 
time intervals for each possible key pair that can be part of any 
PIN typed by a specific user for model training so as to make 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2018.09.003 
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the attacks on that specific user’s PIN entry accurate and use- 
ful. It is usually difficult for an attacker to collect such large 
amount of inter-keystroke data about a victim before launch- 
ing an effective attack. Even if it is possible, such attacks are 
not scalable. If an attacker intends to compromise a new vic- 
tim, he/she needs to collect the new victim’s inter-keystroke 
timing data about all possible key pairs and retrain his/her 
HMM for the new victim. In addition, the success rate of such 
attacks is too low to be practical in online attack settings since 
the number of guesses that is allowed to launch an online at- 
tack is usually restricted to small numbers (e.g., 3, 10, 100) in 
common practice. 
In this paper, we propose a user-independent approach to 
exploiting inter-keystroke timing information for PIN infer- 
ence, which makes inter-keystroke timing attacks much more 
scalable and practical. The model in our attacks is not user- 
specific, which can be trained by a small amount of training 
data (e.g., a few key pairs instead of all possible key pairs) 
about any users (e.g., attackers themselves or people recruited 
by attackers) instead of the target victim. In addition, our ap- 
proach can be applied to attack any new victim without re- 
training the model. The success rate of our attacks is signif- 
icantly higher than random guessing attacks, which poses a 
serious threat when applied to users on a large scale, even in 
online attack settings. 
Our proposed approach leverages a human cognitive model 
to capture the common characteristics across all skilled users 
typing PINs. The human cognitive model is derived from sev- 
eral PIN typing behavioral phenomena which we summarize 
from the cognitive psychology literature. These PIN typing be- 
havioral phenomena are universal for all skilled users. The pa- 
rameters of our cognitive model can be estimated by a few 
key pairs from any user such as the attacker himself. Once the 
cognitive model is built, it can be used to attack any user in- 
putting any PIN on a particular keypad whose geometric mea- 
surement is known. 
At a high level, our attacks proceed as follows. First, an at- 
tacker builds a timing dictionary including all possible PINs 
and their corresponding timing sequences. The timing se- 
quence of each PIN is derived from our cognitive model. Sec- 
ond, the attacker obtains the timing sequence of a victim’s PIN 
entry via various side-channels (e.g., CPU cache, shared event 
loops, I/O interrupts, and SSH). Third, the attacker measures 
the cosine similarity between the observed inter-keystroke 
timing sequence and each entry in the timing dictionary and 
ranks all candidate PINs in the dictionary by their similarity 
values. Lastly, with a ranked list of candidate PINs, the attacker 
may launch online attacks using the PINs successively from 
the ranked list until he/she succeeds or the target account is 
locked (or the attacker aborts before the account is locked). 
Besides the cognitive model that captures the common 
characteristics across all users typing PINs, another contribut- 
ing factor to the user independence of our approach is the way 
an attacker measures the differences between a victim’s PIN 
entry and each time sequence in the timing dictionary. We 
adopt cosine similarity since it is invariant to scaling of input 
vector. It can thus mitigate the negative impact of different 
typing speeds of different users. 
We discover that the effectiveness of our attacks is differ- 
ent for different types of PINs. To examine the effectiveness of 
our attacks to different types of PINs, we study the inner struc- 
ture of the whole PIN space and partition the PIN space into 
different strength levels. In particular, the 6-digit PIN space is 
partitioned into 5 PIN strength levels according to the direc- 
tional density of the inter-keystroke timing sequences in the 
timing dictionary, where level 1 is the weakest and level 5 is the 
strongest. Our attacks achieve much better performance on 
the PINs at the first four levels compared to the strongest level 
(i.e., level 5 ). For example, the attacks with 100 guesses on the 
PINs at levels 1, 2, 3, 4 are 869, 221, 250 and 42 times more effec- 
tive than on the PINs at level 5 , respectively. The results suggest 
that users should choose their PINs at the strongest strength 
level for better security in the presence of inter-keystroke tim- 
ing attacks (however, if all users follow this rule then the can- 
didate PIN space will be reduced by 90%, which is a minor side 
effect). 
We seek various ways to improve the success rate of our 
attacks. One question is whether we can achieve better per- 
formance using target victim’ data for model training, which 
is commonly used in the existing inter-keystroke timing at- 
tacks. In this case, we train the cognitive model using the 
victim’s own inter-keystroke timing data and launch our at- 
tacks on this victim’s PIN entry. The results show that using 
such user-specific training data does help improve the suc- 
cess rate, but by a small margin (˜4%) only. Another question 
is whether an attacker can improve his/her success rate if 
he/she has observed the victim’s PIN entry for multiple times. 
In this case, the attacker can attack based on the average of 
the inter-keystroke timing sequences for multiple PIN entries 
from the same victim. It achieves around 2% performance 
improvement which is not significant either. As a whole our 
study shows that the main reason behind the success of our 
approach is the user-independent part, although adding user- 
dependent data can help improve the performance slightly. 
We further examine the scenario in which an attacker hap- 
pens to know the values of certain digits of the target PIN be- 
fore launching inter-keystroke timing attacks. It is reasonable 
to assume that an attacker may attain such knowledge about 
PIN digits due to the existence of many side-channel attacks 
(e.g., Liu et al., 2015; Shukla et al., 2014; de Souza Faria and 
Kim, 2016; Sun et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016; Yue et al., 2014 ) 
and shoulder surfing attacks ( Tari et al., 2006 ) on the PIN entry. 
Unsurprisingly, the success rate of our attacks is significantly 
improved due to the shrinking of timing dictionary in our at- 
tacks. For example, when the attacker knows 2 digits, the suc- 
cess rate of attacking the PINs in level 1 within 3 attempts is 
improved to 34.9% so that (slightly) more than one out of every 
three target users can be successfully compromised. In this 
case, our attacks are practical in online attack settings when 
applied to a single user or a small number of users. 
In general, the success rate of the proposed attacks may 
not be sufficiently high to pose imminent danger to an indi- 
vidual user’s PIN. Our attacks are still practical because they 
are user-independent and can be applied to attack any num- 
ber of users on a large scale. To show this, we study two cases 
in practical settings, where PINs are used as the only creden- 
tial to protect users’ accounts and where attackers can collect 
many users’ inter-keystroke timing data for PIN entries using 
malicious JavaScripts code. 
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The first case is an online banking system which has three 
million users. If ten percent of its users’ inter-keystroke tim- 
ing data about PIN entries were collected, our online attacks 
could be applied to all these users’ accounts with 50 tries per 
account, which do not lead to any account being locked in 
practice. Consequently, more than 12,000 users’ accounts 
would be compromised on average and these users’ account 
balances and other sensitive information such as usernames 
and addresses would be leaked. 
The second case is a mobile payment platform which has 
more than 520 million users, where each user’s ID of his/her 
account is a mobile phone number. It is not difficult for attack- 
ers to obtain many users’ mobile phone numbers (e.g., from 
public web pages or online markets). The login attempts of 
each user’s account in this platform is limited to 3. On the av- 
erage, an attacker needs to launch online attacks to 83 users’ 
accounts in order to compromise one account. In other words, 
if our attacks were applied to 1/1000 of users’ accounts, then 
6,000 users’ accounts would be compromised on the average. 
Our attacks would cause serious damages since attackers can 
transfer money from victims’ accounts to other accounts. Both 
cases show that our attacks pose a serious threat to real-world 
applications when applied on large scale. 
To mitigate our attacks, we provide several solutions, in- 
cluding choosing longer PINs, choosing PINs at the strongest 
strength level, using a new keypad layout design, and imple- 
menting leakage resilient password systems (LRPSs). For the 
first countermeasure, the security strength of most existing 
PIN systems is determined by the success probability of ran- 
dom guessing attacks ( Yan et al., 2012 ). However, the secu- 
rity strength of PIN systems would be lowered significantly in 
the presence of our inter-keystroke timing attacks. We sug- 
gest users choose 10-digit PINs to maintain the same security 
strength under our attacks as that of the 6-digit PINs under 
random guessing attacks. This solution does not require any 
change to the hardware of current PIN systems, though it re- 
quires users to remember longer PINs. 
To relax the requirement on PIN length, our second sugges- 
tion is that users should choose PINs at the strongest strength 
level (i.e., level 5 for 6-digits PINs 1 ). Our study on 6-digit PINs 
shows that the success rate of attacking PINs at level 5 is 
around 10 times higher than random guessing attacks. There- 
fore, to achieve the similar security strength of 6-digit PIN un- 
der random guessing attacks, we suggest users choose 7-digit 
PINs at the strongest strength level. 
For the third countermeasure, if changes can be made to 
the keypad layout, we propose a novel keypad design more 
secure against our proposed attacks, which is also easy to use. 
Our new design nullifies all inter-keystroke timing attacks, 
which means the success rate of our attacks would be simi- 
lar to that of random guessing attacks. Therefore, users can 
still use 6-digit PINs as before. For the last countermeasure, 
LRPSs have been well studied in the past two decades. Some 
recent work ( Yan et al., 2012 ) shows that in order to achieve the 
same security strength of current 6-digit PIN systems, LRPSs 
require hundreds of seconds to complete an authentication 
1 Level 5 includes 900,000 PINs which account for 90% of the total 
6-digit PINs. It is thus relatively easy for a user to obtain a PIN at 
level 5 if he/she simply chooses his/her PIN randomly. 
session ( Asghar et al., 2010; Hopper and Blum, 2001 ), which 
compromises their usability. 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section, we provide the basics about how to collect 
inter-keystroke timing information from users, how to model 
users’ typing behavior and what our adversary model is. 
2.1. Keystroke timing collection 
To launch any inter-keystroke timing attacks, an attacker 
needs to collect inter-keystroke timing information about 
users’ inputs. Several practical approaches have been pro- 
posed in recent years on how to collect inter-keystroke timing 
information through various leakage channels, including CPU 
cache ( Gruss et al., 2016; 2015; Lipp et al., 2016; Oren et al., 2015; 
Pessl et al., 2016 ), shared event loops ( Vila and Köpf, 2017 ), I/O 
interrupts ( Diao et al., 2016; Lipp et al., 2017; Zhang and Wang, 
2009 ), and SSH ( Song et al., 2001 ). 
The first leakage channel through which attackers can col- 
lect inter-keystroke timing information is CPU cache ( Gruss 
et al., 2016; 2015; Lipp et al., 2016; Oren et al., 2015; Pessl et al., 
2016 ). Through CPU cache, an attacker can observe the effects 
of a user’s keystroke operations and deduce the timestamp 
of each keystroke the user performs on a keyboard. One of 
these approaches ( Oren et al., 2015 ) can be performed 
from browser sandboxes through remote websites using 
JavaScripts code instead of installing malware on users’ 
devices. Besides users’ keystroke operations originated from 
hardware keyboard, other interactive operations, such as tap 
operations and swipe operations that are usually triggered 
on a touch screen, can also be monitored by an attacker ( Lipp 
et al., 2016 ). Therefore, inter-keystroke timing attacks can 
be applied to both devices with a hardware keyboard and 
devices with a soft keyboard. This keystroke timing collection 
approach requires malware installed on the victim’s device to 
access CPU cache but it does not need any permission. 
The second leakage channel through which attackers can 
collect inter-keystroke timing information is shared event 
loops ( Vila and Köpf, 2017 ). Through shared event loops in 
Google Chrome, an attacker can scan an event-delay trace us- 
ing JavaScript and deduce the timestamp of each keystroke 
the user performs on a keyboard. This keystroke timing col- 
lection approach requires an attacker to trick victims to open 
a malicious website which has the permission of running 
JavaScript. 
The third leakage channel through which attackers can col- 
lect inter-keystroke timing information is I/O interrupts ( Diao 
et al., 2016; Lipp et al., 2017; Zhang and Wang, 2009 ). An at- 
tacker may continuously acquire timestamps using JavaScript 
in a measuring process and monitor differences between sub- 
sequent timestamps ( Lipp et al., 2017 ). Significant time dif- 
ferences will occur whenever the measuring process is inter- 
rupted by I/O operations (i.e., keystroke operations). The exact 
timestamp where the user presses a key is clearly visible and 
can be distinguished from other events. This keystroke timing 
collection approach also requires an attacker to trick victims 
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to open a malicious website which has the permission of run- 
ning JavaScript. 
The last leakage channel through which attackers 
can collect inter-keystroke timing information is SSH 
( Song et al., 2001 ). Since every individual keystroke typed 
by a user is sent to a remote machine in a separate IP packet 
immediately after the key is pressed, precise inter-keystroke 
timings of the user’s keystrokes can be learned from the 
arrival times of the packets. This keystroke timing collection 
approach requires an attacker to monitor the network and 
collect the arrival time of SSH packets which does not re- 
quire any malware to be installed on victim’s device or any 
permission from the victim. 
The sampling rates of inter-keystroke timing information 
collected by different approaches are different (e.g., 40,000Hz 
for shared event loops and 100Hz for SSH). In our experiments, 
we use JavaScript to record the key code of each keystroke 
event and the corresponding timestamp to get the ground 
truth. We observe that the timings of key-press events are 
distributed in clusters with a gap of 15 or 16 milliseconds; 
thus, the sampling rate in our experiments is no higher than 
1000/15 ≈ 66.7Hz. Although our sampling rate is relatively low, 
our attacks still achieve satisfactory performance as shown in 
our experimental results ( Section 4.3 ). The performance of our 
attacks may be improved further at higher sampling rates. 
To determine the start and the end of victim’s PIN entry, 
the attacker can monitor all the packets sent by the victim by 
a network sniffing tool on network packets such as Wireshark 
and records the timestamps of all packets whose destination 
IP is the targeted sensitive website (e.g., online banking 
website or Alipay) ( Li et al., 2016 ). Since most of the important 
websites and applications are secured via HTTPS, it does 
not protect the meta data of the traffic such as destination 
server’s IP address, which can be used to recognize the start of 
a time window for searching the victim’s PIN entry using var- 
ious approaches which have been mentioned earlier in this 
section. If the victim is entering PIN on an Android applica- 
tion, Cheng et al. (2017) proposed a no-root approach to detect 
login activities as they share a common pattern that a login 
activity usually consists of two EditText fields for inputting a 
username, and a password and the second EditText field sets 
the attribute inputType to password-related by developers. In 
addition, malware installed in the victims’ phone may make 
use of accessibility feature to monitor the timing of any event 
that is activated by the victim by the id of the view ( Rout, 
2016 ). Since most developers use EditText fields with an id 
of ‘password’ or ‘PIN’ in the layout view, it is easy for the 
attacker to know the start time of a victim’s PIN entry event. 
2.2. Human cognitive models 
2.2.1. History 
Human cognitive models have been studied in the field of 
psychology for decades. They describe one or more specific 
human cognitive processes (e.g., memory, perception, atten- 
tion, reasoning, and problem-solving) for the purpose of bet- 
ter understanding, predicting and simulating human behavior 
( Anderson, 2013 ). 
Typing PINs on a numeric keypad is one of the most 
important human-computer interactions in our daily life and 
it involves complicated interactions of concurrent perceptual, 
cognitive, and motoric processes ( Wu, 2007 ). To model typing 
behaviors and explore its underlying mechanisms, cognitive 
psychologists apply the knowledge of psychology, human- 
computer interaction and neuroscience.Card et al. (1980) 
proposed a keystroke-level model (KLM) to predict the time of 
a user accomplishing a given task without errors using a given 
interactive computer system. For typing tasks, KLM gives a 
rough estimate of the average inter-keystroke time, which is 
calculated by dividing the total time taken in a typing test 
by the total number of non-error keystrokes. Rumelhart and 
Norman (1982) built a model of typing and provide detailed 
predictions about the movement of fingers and the relative 
response time for letters in different contexts. Furthermore, 
John (1996) proposed a typing performance theory which is 
built within the framework of the Model Human Processor 
(MHP) ( Card et al., 1986 ) and can offer a more precise estima- 
tion. These models of cognitive processing have provided a 
wealth of information regarding how humans interact with 
keyboards. 
Cognitive psychologists and HCI researchers have also de- 
veloped several software tools for estimating human perfor- 
mance in terms of time needed by an average skilled user to 
finish a specific task, such as Cogulator ( Estes, 2017 ), CogTool 
( Teo et al., 2012 ), SANLab-CM ( Patton and Gray, 2010 ). Such 
tools are normally used for modeling and simulating compli- 
cated processes involving both computer and human users, 
but this paper focuses on determining the parameters of a 
specific model of the typing behavior, so we do not use such 
tools in our work. In the following sections, we build a new 
keystroke model combining models mentioned above with 
empirical analysis. 
2.2.2. Typing behavioral phenomena 
Typing is a complex procedure involving cognitive activities 
as well as body movements, but we can still capture the com- 
mon characteristics across all skilled users’ typing behaviors. 
The typing procedure usually involves two parts: cognitive 
and motoric processes. During the cognitive process, the user 
conducts a memory retrieval process. Specifically in our sce- 
nario, the user recalls his/her PIN from the long-term mem- 
ory, stores it into the working memory and mentally prepares 
for executing physical actions. During the motoric process, the 
user moves his/her hand and fingers to the right key, presses 
the key, releases the key and prepares for the next keystroke. 
The total time between two keystrokes is the sum of the time 
for these two parts. 
PIN entry behavior is one of the most common typing be- 
haviors in our daily life. In order to explore PIN entry behavior, 
we consider four common phenomena about typing behaviors 
across all skilled users reported in the literature Salthouse, 
1986 . 
Phenomenon 1. The rate of typing is dependent on how familiar 
the user is with the typed string. According to a statistics report, 
46 percent of the U.S. students use credit cards on a regular 
basis for everyday purchases ( Statista.com, 2015 ). And the av- 
erage iPhone user tends to unlock his/her device 80 times in a 
day ( Ranosa, 2016 ) while Android users tend to unlock their 
smartphones an average 110 times a day ( Warzel, 2013 ), so 
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there is no doubt that people are proficient in typing their 
PINs. 
Phenomenon 2. The variability of inter-keystroke time decreases 
as the user’s skill level increases. The distributions of inter- 
keystroke time for the same keystroke in the same context but 
across multiple repetitions are similar ( Salthouse, 1984 ). This 
phenomenon indicates that the typing pattern will stabilize 
after several practices. 
Phenomenon 3. Inter-keystroke time of typing decreases following 
the power law of practice. Typing speed of a user will be signifi- 
cantly improved as the number of inputs increases. According 
to the learning curve of a single user in the study of Gentner 
(1983) , the improvement of inter-keystroke time follows ex- 
ponential growth. If a skilled user can input PINs smoothly 
enough, the time of cognitive process may be negligible. One 
reason is that muscle memory has been built after frequently 
typing and it may take little time for the cognitive processor 
to make decisions and schedule actions with the motoric pro- 
cessor. 
Phenomenon 4. The inter-keystroke time is dependent on the spe- 
cific context, especially for the topography of the keyboard. The spe- 
cific context here refers to the character before and after the 
target character. This topographical effect has been reported 
by Gentner (1982, 1983) , Rumelhart and Norman (1982) , and 
Shaffer (1973) . Intuitively, the latency between two keystrokes 
has a positive correlation to their distance on the keypad. 
Based on Phenomenas 1 and 2 , the action of enter- 
ing a PIN can be regarded as conducted by a skilled user 
whose typing pattern is stable and predictable. Based on 
Phenomenas 2 and 3 , we arrange a practice session before 
data collection in our experiments in order to collect skilled 
users’ data and simulate people entering PINs in real life. 
For Phenomenon 4 , we estimate the topographical effect by a 
function of the finger’s moving distance and the size of target 
key using Fitts’s law ( Fitts, 1954 ). 
2.2.3. Inter-keystroke timing modeling 
We incorporate the above typing behavior phenomena to con- 
struct a linear model for predicting the inter-keystroke tim- 
ings of any key pair. 
For the topographical effect, our model uses Fitts’s law 
( Fitts, 1954 ) to make finer predictions. Fitts’s law is a descrip- 
tive model of human movement which can predict the time 
required to move to a target area. It is used to model the act of 
physically touching an object with a finger or virtually point- 
ing to an object. Striking the numeric keypad with one finger 
can be seen as this kind of action. It is a function of the ratio 
between the distance to the target ( D ) and target width ( W ): 
T = a + b ∗ I = a + b ∗ log 2 
(
D 
W 
+ 1 
)
, (1) 
where D is the distance from the start point to the center of 
the target, W is the effective width of the target in the direction 
of the motion 2 , I = log 2 (D/W + 1) is called the index of difficulty, 
2 According to our observations in the experiments, the effective 
press area of each key is close to a circle centered on the center 
a and b are parameters varying from context to context, and 
from person to person. 
We use the geometric center of each key to obtain the dis- 
tance of each key pair. As for the repeated pressed key like ‘99’, 
we set I = 0 so that T motor = a . We estimate the values of a and 
b using inter-keystroke timing data of real human users. Note 
that the amount of needed data is small since there are just 
two unknowns. With these inter-keystroke timing data and 
the geometric measurement of victim’s keyboard, an attacker 
can build his/her own inter-keystroke timing model. 
We also examine other cognitive operations which may 
affect the inter-keystroke times, including word-segment ef- 
fect and word-end effect. We extend the cognitive model and 
conduct a significance testing on all coefficients to validate 
the model. However, the results of significance testing show 
that the impact of word-end effect and word-segment effects 
are not statistically significant (see Appendix A ). We thus de- 
cide to consider the topographical effect only in our cognitive 
model. 
2.3. Adversary model 
2.3.1. Basic premises 
It is usually difficult for malware to directly record keystrokes 
due to the use of keylogger detection technologies ( Aslam 
et al., 2004; Ortolani and Crispo, 2012; Ortolani et al., 2010; 
Sukhram and Hayajneh, 2017; Tian et al., 2017 ). The barrier 
for launching inter-keystroke timing attacks in real-world is 
much lower than directly recording keystrokes. Recent work 
(e.g., Diao et al., 2016; Gruss et al., 2016; Gruss et al., 2015; 
Lipp et al., 2017; Lipp et al., 2016; Oren et al., 2015; Pessl et al., 
2016; Song et al., 2001; Vila and Köpf, 2017; Zhang and Wang, 
2009 ) has introduced many practical approaches to attaining 
user’s keystroke timing information. While these work focus 
on how to capture keystroke timing information, our work fo- 
cuses on how to make use of keystroke timing information 
to recover PINs. Therefore, our adversary model assumes that 
an attacker has already obtained the inter-keystroke timing 
information about a target user (victim) typing his/her PIN on 
a numeric keypad. 
The inter-keystroke timing information about a PIN can be 
observed just once or a number of times via several side chan- 
nels such as CPU cache, shared event loops, I/O interrupts, SSH 
as introduced in Section 2.1 . We notice that directly record- 
ing keystrokes requires certain permissions that are usually 
difficult to be gained (e.g., most software keyloggers require 
Windows hooks); in comparison, it is relatively easier for an 
attacker to obtain keystroke timing information. In particular, 
the shared event loop( Vila and Köpf, 2017 ) and I/O interrupts 
approaches ( Lipp et al., 2017 ) require that victim’ browser sup- 
port JavaScript, which is common for popular browsers in the 
default setting. In addition, the CPU cache ( Lipp et al., 2016 ) 
and SSH approaches ( Song et al., 2001 ) require no permission 
to obtain keystroke timing information. 
It is also assumed that an attacker knows the layout of the 
keyboard (including the size of each key and the distance be- 
of the key and with a radius equal to the shorter side of the key 
(which is 0.5 inches). Therefore, we use 0.5 inches as the effective 
width for all keys including 0 and < Enter > keys. 
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Fig. 1 – The layout of the numeric pad used in our 
experiments. 
tween each key pair) that the target victim uses in advance. 
This is a reasonable assumption since in most cases, the vic- 
tim inputs his/her PINs on the numeric keypads of ATMs, POS 
terminals, or standard keyboards. The layouts of these key- 
pads are standardized or can be easily obtained in the public 
place. Fig. 1 shows the layout of a DELL SK-8115 numeric key- 
pad used in our experiments. 
For the victim’s PIN typing behavior, it is assumed that one 
finger is used to enter the whole PIN followed by an < Enter > 
key press to signal the end of a PIN entry process. It is also 
a reasonable assumption since according to our observation 
and the survey 3 we conducted, a majority of users (62%) prefer 
using a single finger for PIN entry. 
2.3.2. Online attacks 
In online attack settings, an attacker consecutively tries a 
number of candidate PINs to attack a PIN-protected account 
until the correct PIN is found or the account is locked (or the 
attacker aborts before the account is locked). The online at- 
tack that has been studied in most previous research on PIN 
systems ( Martinovic et al., 2014 ) is random guessing attack in 
which an attacker inputs random PINs. In this paper, we con- 
sider four other online attack settings by assuming that an 
attacker has different knowledge about a victim’s typing be- 
havior or the target PIN: 
(i) General attacks : An attacker collects a small amount of 
inter-keystroke timing data from the attacker himself 
or people he/she recruits for model training and obtains 
a single inter-keystroke timing sequence of a PIN entry 
made by a victim for PIN inference. 
(ii) Targeted attacks : An attacker collects a small amount 
of inter-keystroke timing data about a victim typing 
known numerical sequences for model training and ob- 
3 Please refer to the Section 6.4 for the detailed statistical results. 
tains a single inter-keystroke timing sequence of a PIN 
entry made by the victim for PIN inference. 
(iii) Multi-entry attacks : An attacker collects a small amount 
of inter-keystroke timing data from the attacker himself 
or people he/she recruits for model training and cap- 
tures several inter-keystroke timing sequences about a 
victim entering the same PIN. In this case, the attacker 
may combine all inter-keystroke timing sequences and 
obtain an averaged timing sequence for PIN inference. 
(iv) Known digits attacks : An attacker knows certain dig- 
its of a target PIN before launching our general attacks . 
Such knowledge may be attained from various side- 
channel attacks ( Liu et al., 2015; Shukla et al., 2014; 
de Souza Faria and Kim, 2016; Sun et al., 2016; Wang 
et al., 2016; Yue et al., 2014 ) or shoulder surfing attacks 
( Tari et al., 2006 ). 
Limited number of login attempts . Most PIN systems enforce sus- 
picious login detection and lockout ( Freeman et al., 2016 ), and 
thus the number of PINs an attacker may try in an online at- 
tack is limited. A successful online attack is defined as an at- 
tacker hitting the correct PIN within the number of allowed at- 
tempts. The number of login attempts is normally restricted to 
3 for PINs with payment cards. When a payment card is used 
on a POS terminal or with a card reader, entering a PIN wrongly 
for 3 times may get the card locked. This limit is usually larger 
for mobile devices. For example, an Android device gets locked 
temporarily for 30 seconds after every 5 failed attempts, while 
an iOS device is restored to factory settings after 10 failed lo- 
gins. Other cases limit online attackers to no more than 100 
consecutive failed attempts on a single account according to 
the digital authentication guidelines ( Grassi and Fenton, 2016 ) 
and electronic authentication guidelines ( Grassi and Fenton, 
2013 ). In our experiments, we demonstrate the success rates 
of our attacks with various limits on the number of consecu- 
tive login attempts. 
2.3.3. Offline attacks 
In offline attack settings, it is assumed that an offline valida- 
tion of guessed PINs can be performed. This is a less realis- 
tic scenario since users’ PINs are usually stored in tamper- 
resistant hardware security modules on the server side as a 
common practice. Therefore, we focus on the online attacks 
in this paper. 
3. Attack methodology 
In this section, we describe the steps of our inter-keystroke 
timing attacks in detail. Fig. 2 shows an overview of our inter- 
keystroke timing attacks, including a learning phase and an 
attacking phase. In the learning phase, an attacker trains a 
cognitive model based on certain collected data and builds a 
timing dictionary. In the attacking phase, the attacker (i) ob- 
serves one or more entries from a victim, (ii) calculates the 
similarity between the timing sequence of the observed PIN 
entry and the calculated timing sequence of each entry in the 
timing dictionary, (iii) ranks all candidate PINs according to 
the similarity values, and (iv) attempts to login to the victim’s 
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Fig. 2 – Overview of our inter-keystroke timing attacks. 
Table 1 – A segment in the inter-keystroke timing dictionary used in our experiments. 
PINs K 1 → K 2 K 2 → K 3 K 3 → K 4 K 4 → K 5 K 5 → K 6 K 6 → < Enter > 
504316 232.9502 232.9502 237.2201 231.3787 237.2201 226.0874 
504317 232.9502 232.9502 237.2201 231.3787 231.3787 268.5020 
504318 232.9502 232.9502 237.2201 231.3787 237.2201 256.9941 
504319 232.9502 232.9502 237.2201 231.3787 250.0087 247.2787 
504320 232.9502 232.9502 237.2201 199.0121 203.7241 244.2814 
504321 232.9502 232.9502 237.2201 199.0121 199.0121 254.0817 
504322 232.9502 232.9502 237.2201 199.0121 135.9120 232.9502 
504323 232.9502 232.9502 237.2201 199.0121 199.0121 203.7241 
504324 232.9502 232.9502 237.2201 199.0121 214.2976 259.6575 
504325 232.9502 232.9502 237.2201 199.0121 199.0121 243.2131 
account using the PINs in the ranked list starting from the top 
in an online attack. 
3.1. Learning phase 
Data collection. In the learning phase, an attacker needs to 
collect the inter-keystroke timing sequences for a small num- 
ber of key pairs for model training. Since our cognitive model 
consists of two parameters, it requires that the training data 
consists of the inter-keystroke timing sequences for at least 
two key pairs (1350 key pairs are used in our experiment). The 
training data used in the learning phase can be collected from 
the attacker himself or people he/she recruits. The simplest 
way to collect training data is to implement a keylogger which 
records the key code of every keystroke event and the corre- 
sponding timestamp to get the ground truth. 
Cognitive model training . With the training data, the attacker 
can estimate the coefficients of the linear equation ( Eq. (4) ) in 
our cognitive model using the standard least squares method. 
Timing dictionary building . Once the cognitive model is fixed, 
the attacker can compute the inter-keystroke timing se- 
quences for all PINs and then generate a timing dictionary D = 
{ ( PIN i , 
−→ 
T i ) } for i = 1 , 2 , . . . , 10 l where 
−→ 
T i = (T i 1 , T i 2 , ..., T il ) 
and l is the PIN length. Here, T ij is computed according to 
the cognitive model for j th key pair ( K i j , K i ( j+1) ) in the i th PIN 
( K i 1 , K i 2 , . . . , K il ), where j = 1 , 2 , . . . , l and K i (l+1) = < Enter > . 
Table 1 shows a segment in the inter-keystroke timing dictio- 
nary used in our experiments. 
3.2. Attacking phase 
Data collection . In the attacking phase, an attacker needs to ob- 
tain a single inter-keystroke timing sequence 
−→ 
T of a PIN en- 
try made by a victim for PIN inference. Similar to each timing 
sequence in the timing dictionary, 
−→ 
T is an l -dimensional se- 
quence, where l denotes the length of the target PIN. 
Similarity calculation . Once the attacker has an observed 
timing sequence 
−→ 
T of the target PIN (from a victim) and a tim- 
ing dictionary D , he/she can measure the similarity between −→ 
T and each timing sequence in D . 
There are many similarity metrics the attacker can use. We 
test three different metrics (cosine similarity, Euclidean dis- 
tance and Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient) 
and discover that the cosine similarity gives the best results 
in most attacks. The cosine similarity is a measurement of the 
level of similarity between two vectors 
−→ 
A and 
−→ 
B that returns 
the cosine of the angle between them and is computed as fol- 
lows: 
cos = 
−→ 
A · −→ B ∥∥∥−→ A ∥∥∥ · ∥∥∥−→ B ∥∥∥ = 
∑ l 
i =1 a i b i √ ∑ l 
i =1 a 2 i ·
√ ∑ l 
i =1 b 2 i 
, (2) 
where a i and b i are the i -th elements of l -dimensional vectors −→ 
A and 
−→ 
B , respectively. The time complexity for the similar- 
ity calculation is O ( n ), where n is the number of all possible 
PINs. The cosine similarity is scale-free, i.e., the amplitudes 
of 
−→ 
A and 
−→ 
B have no impact to the result. This feature im- 
proves the robustness of our attacks against variation of typ- 
ing speeds between victims and different users in the training 
data, which thus contributes to the user independence of our 
approach. 
Ranking and using PINs in login attempts . The attacker then 
ranks all entries in the timing dictionary according to their 
similarity values so that those entries more similar to 
−→ 
T ap- 
pear closer to the top. Here, we use the Quicksort algorithm 
whose time complexity is O ( n ∗log ( n )) to rank all candidate 
PINs. Finally, the attacker attempts to login to the victim’s ac- 
count using the PINs starting from the top in the ranked list 
in an online attack. 
4. Experiments 
An IRB-approved user study is conducted to collect users’ 
inter-keystroke timing data about PIN entries on a numeric 
keypad. The data collected from participants are kept confi- 
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Table 2 – List of PINs used in our experiments. 
Level 1 777,777 777,333 222,233 633,333 555,553 
443,333 088,886 000,553 055,333 577,773 
Level 2 008,853 166,034 226,633 515,553 009,666 
800,053 705,333 100,086 222,253 100,553 
Level 3 911,182 590,253 537,473 086,483 084,953 
331,086 410,886 547,733 537,802 199,993 
Level 4 990,872 098,046 760,973 301,509 330,117 
301,246 095,653 589,107 530,271 603,294 
Level 5 420,381 191,061 806,205 079,039 033,645 
146,928 501,347 635,210 684,032 706,759 
dential and anonymized. To examine the effectiveness of our 
attacks to different types of PINs, we study the inner struc- 
ture of the whole PIN space and partition the PIN space into 
different strength levels. In this section, we present the per- 
formance of our attacks in the general attack setting in which 
the training data and testing data are collected from different 
users. 
4.1. User study 
Our user study involves 55 participants, including 24 males 
and 31 females with ages ranging from 19 to 34. All partic- 
ipants are students or members of staff at the Singapore 
Management University. Each participant is paid 10 Singa- 
pore dollars as a compensation for his/her time and effort. 
Since 6-digit PINs are commonly used in many PIN-based 
authentication systems, we use 6-digit PINs as examples of 
our attacks. Our user study consists of two sessions: train- 
ing session and testing session. In both sessions, we use 
JavaScript to record the key code of each keystroke event and 
the corresponding timestamp to get the ground truth. 
In the training session, 5 participants are asked to en- 
ter three 6-digit PINs (i.e., 146928, 501347, 635210) on a nu- 
meric keypad. The PINs they typed are randomly selected from 
the whole 6-digit PIN space. The participants are required to 
memorize one PIN intentionally, type the PIN for several times 
as exercises and type more times for data collection; then, 
they are required to forget the current PIN, and proceed in the 
experiment with the next PIN. In our experiments, we observe 
that exercises for five times are sufficient for a participant to 
type a 6-digit PIN fluently. Then the participants type each PIN 
for 15 times continuously for training data collection. We en- 
sure that each PIN entry is typed correctly. If a participant en- 
ters incorrect digits and uses the < Delete > or < Backspace > 
key to correct an input, he/she is required to retype the PIN. 
In the testing session, we choose 50 PINs with 10 PINs ran- 
domly selected from each of five PIN strength levels as listed in 
Table 2 . The other 50 participants (except the five in training to 
make our attacks user independent) are asked to enter PINs on 
the same numeric keypad. Each participant is assigned to type 
25 PINs with 5 PINs chosen randomly from the 10 PINs in each 
PIN strength level. Similar to the training session, the partici- 
pants type each PIN for 5 times as practice and type each PIN 
for 15 times for testing data collection. In total, 225 PIN entries 
are collected for training and 18,750 PIN entries for testing. 
The raw data of each PIN entry we collect consists of 
the timestamps of ( l +1) keystroke events for l -digit PINs, 
where the last keystroke is for pressing the < Enter > key. We 
define the inter-keystroke timing between keystrokes K i and 
K i +1 as the difference between the two consecutive key-down 
times to cover both the time of finger movement between the 
two keys and the time for pressing the second key: 
T i = T ↓ K i +1 − T 
↓ 
K i 
. (3) 
Therefore, the inter-keystroke timing sequence of each 
PIN entry used in our experiment is represented by an 
l -dimensional sequence 
−→ 
T = (T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T l ) . 
4.2. PIN strength level 
We study the inner structure of the whole PIN space to exam- 
ine the effectiveness of our attacks to different PINs. We pro- 
pose an approach to partitioning the whole PIN space into dif- 
ferent PIN strength levels according to the directional density 
of the inter-keystroke timing sequences in the timing dictio- 
nary. Each inter-keystroke timing sequence in the timing dic- 
tionary can be considered as an l -dimensional directional vec- 
tor, where l is the PIN length. Intuitively, if a PIN vector locates 
in a dense region according to the cosine similarity measure- 
ment in the vector space, it is more difficult for an attacker to 
single it out, that is, infer the PIN. This implies that such a PIN 
is more secure against our attacks since our attacks rank can- 
didate PINs according to the cosine similarity between each 
entry in the timing dictionary and the observed timing se- 
quence of a target PIN as explained in Section 3.2 . Based on 
this observation, we propose Algorithm 1 to measure the PIN 
strength of l -digit PINs. 
Algorithm 1: PIN strength measurement. 
Input: A trained timing dictionary D = { ( PIN i , 
−→ 
T i ) } for i = 
1 , 2 , . . . , 10 l where 
−→ 
T i = (T i 1 , T i 2 , ..., T il ) . 
Output: The strength measurement 
−→ 
S i for each PIN i . 
1: for each vector 
−→ 
T i in D do 
2: calculate the cosine similarity between 
−→ 
T i and all 
other vectors in D and obtain a cosine similarity tu- 
ple (cos i 1 , cos i 2 , .., cos i (i −1) , cos i (i +1) , .., cos i (10 l −1) ) where cos i j = −→ 
T i ·
−→ 
T j ∥∥∥−→ T i 
∥∥∥·∥∥∥−→ T j 
∥∥∥
3: rank all cosine similarities in descending order and ob- 
tain a new tuple (cos ′ i 1 , cos 
′ 
i 2 , . . . , cos 
′ 
i (10 l −1) ) where cos 
′ 
i 1 ≥
cos ′ i 2 ≥ ... ≥ cos ′ i (10 l −1) 
4: 
−→ 
S i = ( G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G l ) where G j = 
1 
9 ∗10 j−1 
∑ 
10 j−1 ≤n ≤10 j −1 cos 
′ 
n and j = 1 , 2 , . . . , l. 
5: end for 
Algorithm 1 takes a trained timing dictionary D as the in- 
put. For each timing vector 
−→ 
T i for PIN i in D , the algorithm first 
calculates the cosine similarity between 
−→ 
T i and all other vec- 
tors in D . It then ranks all of the calculated cosine similarities 
in descending order and divide them into l groups where the 
j th group consists of (10 j−1 ) th to (10 j − 1) th cosine similarities. 
Finally, it calculates the average value G j of cosine similari- 
ties for group j , where j = 1 , 2 , . . . , l. The algorithm output 
an l -dimensional tuple 
−→ 
S i = ( G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G l ) to represent the 
PIN strength for each PIN i , where i = 1 , 2 , . . . , 10 l . The overall 
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Fig. 3 – The proportion of human-chosen PINs at each 
strength level. 
Fig. 4 – The averaged frequency of each PIN at different 
strength levels. 
time complexity of our PIN strength measurement algorithm 
is O ( l ∗10 2 l ) and its space complexity is O ( l ∗10 l ). 
With the strength measurement ( G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G l ) for all PINs, 
we partition the whole PIN space into ( l -1) levels. First, an 
indirect stable sort with multiple keys is performed on all PINs. 
To be specific, it first ranks all PINs by key G 1 , if two PINs have 
the same value for key G 1 ; then it ranks them by key G 2 ; and so 
on. As a result, it ranks all 10 l PINs according to PIN strength 
in ascending order. The first 100 PINs after ranking are catego- 
rized into level 1 which includes the weakest PINs. The 101 th 
to 1000 th PINs are categorized into level 2 ; the 1001 th to 10000 th 
PINs are categorized into level 3 ; and so on. In our experiments, 
we take 6-digit PINs as examples and divide all 6-digit PINs 
into 5 categories. Level 1 to level 5 consist of 100, 900, 9000, 
90,000, 900,000 PINs, respectively. 
We further study the distribution of human-chosen 6-digit 
PINs according to our PIN space partition. The human-chosen 
6-digit PINs are extracted from two leaked large-scale pass- 
word databases (i.e., Rockyou and CSDN). Fig. 3 shows the pro- 
portion of human-chosen PINs at each strength level 1 and 
Fig. 4 shows the averaged frequency of each PIN at different 
strength levels. It is observed that although the PINs at the 
lowest security level (i.e., level 1 ) account for only 0.01% of 
the total, more than 2.7% of real users prefer to select PINs at 
this level and the averaged frequency of at this level is signif- 
icantly higher than other strength levels. These results show 
1 Since the levels are dictionary-dependent, the results will 
change if a different timing dictionary is used. But conclusions re- 
main unchanged. 
Fig. 5 – The performance of general attacks . 
that users tend to select weak PINs more often than strong 
PINs. It is thus meaningful to evaluate PIN attacks at different 
security levels. 
4.3. Performance evaluation 
We first evaluate the performance of our attacks in the general 
attack setting. First, we use the inter-keystroke timing data 
from the training session of our user study to train the cog- 
nitive model. The parameter a and b are 135.91 and 47.73, re- 
spectively. Based on this trained cognitive model, we estimate 
the timing sequence of all 10 6 6-digit PINs and generate a tim- 
ing dictionary. According to our experiments, it took 21.7s to 
generate a timing dictionary. 
Then, we take each PIN entry typed by the participants 
from the testing session as an independent attacking case. In 
total, there are 18,750 individual cases for 50 PINs. Note that 
the training data and the testing data in our user study are col- 
lected from different groups of participants, which make our 
attacks user-independent. For each attacking case, we mea- 
sure the cosine similarity between the observed timing se- 
quence and each entry in the timing dictionary and rank all 
PINs according to their similarity values in the descending or- 
der. Given an observed timing sequence, it takes around 1s to 
get the ranking list of all candidate PINs in the general attack. 
If the correct PIN ranks x th in the ranked list, an attacker needs 
to log into the target victim’s account for x times until success. 
The performance of such general attacks is shown in Fig. 5 , 
where the x-axis denotes the number of consecutive attempts 
and the y-axis denotes the success rate of hitting the correct 
PIN in an attack. The success rate of our attacks is calculated 
as the observed frequency that the correct PIN appears in the 
top x ranked PINs across all attacking cases. Note that the suc- 
cess rate of our attacks is 0 before any successful case is ob- 
served. Fig. 5 also shows the success rate of random guessing 
attacks, assuming that the correct PIN has an equal probabil- 
ity to appear at any position between 1 and 10 6 . The success 
rate of random guessing attacks is ( 10 
l −1 
x −1 ) / ( 
10 l 
x ) for an l -digit PIN 
where x is the number of consecutive login attempts (if al- 
lowed). 
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A general trend in Fig. 5 is that it is more effective to at- 
tack PINs at lower strength levels. Beyond our expectation, the 
performance of PINs at level 3 is better than level 2 but the dif- 
ference between them is not too significant. Maybe it is be- 
cause that number of samples in each levels is small in our 
user study. This trend suggests that users should choose their 
PINs at the strongest strength level for better security in the 
presence of inter-keystroke timing attacks. 
Another trend in Fig. 5 is that the performance of general 
attacks is much better than random guessing attacks. In par- 
ticular, if the number of allowed attempts is limited to 100, 10 
and 3, our general attacks improve the success rate by 522, 2247 
and 4004 times on average of all PIN strength levels over the 
random guessing attacks, respectively. 
Our experimental results imply that the existing PIN-based 
authentication systems are vulnerable to our attacks, espe- 
cially when they are launched at a large scale. When a victim 
types a PIN at level 1 , an attacker can launch a successful at- 
tack within 10 consecutive attempts with a probability about 
10%. It has been argued that if 10% of accounts in an authen- 
tication system are compromised, an attacker may access all 
resources of the system ( Florêncio et al., 2016 ). 
5. Other specific attacks 
While the general attacks we discussed in the previous section 
are user-independent (i.e., the training data and the testing 
data are collected from different users), we examine other spe- 
cific attacks to improve the success rate of general attacks with 
different assumptions on attackers’ capabilities. 
5.1. Target attacks 
We first examine whether the performance of our attacks 
can be improved using target victims’ data for model train- 
ing, which is also used in HMM-based attacks in the litera- 
ture ( Kune and Kim, 2010; Song et al., 2001; Zhang and Wang, 
2009 ). Hence, we propose targeted attacks where an attacker ob- 
tains a small amount of inter-keystroke timing data about a 
victim typing known numerical sequences for model training. 
Although both targeted attacks and HMM-based attacks train 
their models based on a victim’s own data, our approach re- 
quires much less training data. Our approach requires an at- 
tacker to know the inter-keystroke timing data about a few 
key pairs rather than all key pairs as required in HMM-based 
attacks. To collect such training data in practice, an attacker 
may trick a victim to install malware on his/her smartphone 
and collect inter-keystroke timing data when the victim dials 
phone numbers. Another possible way of collecting such data 
is to trick a victim to enter insensitive numerical sequences 
through phishing websites or phishing phone calls. 
The procedure of the experiment of targeted attacks is sim- 
ilar to that of general attacks except that we use the inter- 
keystroke timing data from the testing session of our user 
study to train the cognitive model. In particular, to attack any 
one of the 25 PINs entered by a participant, we randomly 
choose 2 other PINs out of the 25 PINs entered by the same par- 
ticipant and use 30 collected inter-keystroke timing sequences 
for these 2 PINs for model training. In comparison, previous 
Fig. 6 – The performance of targeted attacks . 
HMM-based attacks require that an attacker should obtain 30–
50 inter-keystroke timing sequence for each of 110 key pairs 
(10 ×10 digit-to-digit key pairs and 10 digit-to- < Enter > key 
pairs) from a victim for model training. The same as the gen- 
eral attacks , we take each PIN entry typed by the participants 
from the testing session as an independent attacking case. 
Fig. 6 shows that targeted attacks have a similar trend as gen- 
eral attacks in terms of the effectiveness of attacking PINs at 
different PIN strength levels. Compared to general attacks , the 
success rate of targeted attacks is improved by about 4% on av- 
erage for all levels. Considering that targeted attacks are user- 
dependent, and they do not improve the success rate signifi- 
cantly over the general attacks , attackers may still prefer general 
attacks in practice. 
5.2. Multi-entry attacks 
We then examine whether an attacker can improve his/her 
success rate if he/she observes the victim’s PIN entry for mul- 
tiple times. Hence, we propose multi-entry attacks where an at- 
tacker captures the inter-keystroke timing sequences about a 
victim entering the same PIN for multiple times. With k inter- 
keystroke timing sequences of one PIN, an attacker can calcu- 
late an averaged timing sequence for PIN inference. 
First, the attacker normalizes each observed PIN entry’s 
inter-keystroke timing sequence so as to attain the same 
amplitude. The ratio of Sum i to Sum is considered as the 
scaling value for the i -th inter-keystroke timing sequence −→ 
T i = (T i 1 , T i 2 , . . . , T il ) , where Sum i = 
∑ 
1 ≤ j≤l T i j , Sum = 
1 
k 
∑ 
1 ≤i ≤k Sum i , and l is the PIN length. 
Then, the attacker calculates the i -th scaled inter- 
keystroke timing sequence 
−→ 
T ′ i = 
−→ 
T i × ( Sum / Sum i ) . Given k 
scaled timing sequences 
−→ 
T ′ 1 = (T ′ 11 , T ′ 12 , . . . , T ′ 1 l ) , ..., 
−→ 
T ′ k = 
(T ′ k 1 , T 
′ 
k 2 , . . . , T 
′ 
kl ) , the attacker generates an averaged tim- 
ing sequence (T ′ 1 , T 
′ 
2 , . . . , T 
′ 
l ) where T 
′ 
j = 1 k 
∑ 
1 ≤i ≤k T ′ i j . 
Similar to the general attacks , the attacker trains a cognitive 
model from other users’ inputs and builds a timing dictionary. 
The attacker then calculates the similarity between the calcu- 
lated averaged timing sequence and each entry in the timing 
dictionary and ranks all PINs according to their similarity val- 
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Fig. 7 – The performance of multi-entry attacks . 
ues. Finally, the attacker attempts to login to the victim’s ac- 
count using the PINs starting from the top in the ranked list 
in an online attack. 
In the experiment of multi-entry attacks , the same cognitive 
model and timing dictionary are used as in general attacks . We 
take the averaged inter-keystroke timing information of 10 PIN 
entries (i.e., k = 10 ) from each participant as an independent 
case. The procedure of the experiment of multi-entry attacks is 
similar to that of general attacks except that we take the av- 
eraged timing sequence as the observed timing sequence in 
each attacking case. 
Fig. 7 shows that multi-entry attacks have a similar trend as 
general attacks in terms of the effectiveness of attacking PINs 
at different PIN strength levels. Compared to general attacks, 
multi-entry attacks achieves better performance when x ranges 
from 100 to 10 6 but achieves worse performance to the PINs at 
level 2, 4, 5 when x ranges from 1 to 100. One possible reason 
is that the number of samples in multi-entry attacks is much 
less than general attacks and the observation of finding the po- 
sition of correct PIN in the top 100 is based on a large number 
of samples. In general, multi-entry attacks outperform general 
attacks with insignificant improvement (below 2% on average 
for all levels). 
5.3. Known digits attacks 
Considering that both targeted attacks and multi-entry attacks 
bring little improvement over general attacks , we further pro- 
pose known digits attacks which improve the success rate sig- 
nificantly. 
In this case, an attacker knows certain digits of a target PIN 
before launching inter-keystroke timing attacks (e.g., through 
other side channel attacks ( Liu et al., 2015; Shukla et al., 2014; 
de Souza Faria and Kim, 2016; Sun et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016; 
Yue et al., 2014 ) or shoulder surfing attacks Tari et al., 2006 ). 
Hence, he/she can reduce the size of his/her timing dictionary. 
For example, if the first two digits are known to the attacker 
which are ‘1’ and ‘2’, the reduced timing dictionary consists 
of 10 4 candidate PINs which range from ‘120000’ to ‘129999’. 
The attacker measures the similarity between the observed 
timing sequence and each timing sequences in the reduced 
timing dictionary and ranks these 10 4 candidate PINs accord- 
ing to their similarity values. Finally, the attacker attempts to 
log into the victim’s account using the PINs starting from the 
top in the ranked list in an online attack. 
In the experiment of known digits attacks , we use the same 
cognitive model as in general attacks and generate reduced 
timing dictionaries. We evaluate the cases where an attacker 
obtains 1, 2 or 3 digit(s) of a target PIN. For each attacking 
case, one inter-keystroke timing sequence for each PIN entry is 
used. We enumerate all cases where the known value(s) are at 
any position(s) of the target PIN (i.e., 6 cases for known 1 digit, 
15 cases for known 2 digits and 20 cases for known 3 digits for 
each PIN entry). For the similarity calculation, we measure the 
similarity between the observed timing sequence and each 
entry in the corresponding reduced timing dictionary. When 
an attacker knows any k digits of an l -digit PIN, the success 
rate of random guessing attacks is ( 10 
l−k −1 
x −1 ) / ( 
10 l−k 
x ) where x is 
the number of consecutive login attempts (if allowed). 
The results of known digits attacks are shown in Fig. 8 . It 
is clear that the success rate of known digits attacks is signif- 
icantly higher than general attacks . For example, the success 
rates of inferring a target PIN at level 1 within 3 attempts are 
14.2%, 23.3%, and 34.9% when 1 digit, 2 digits, and 3 digits are 
known by the attacker, and they are 1.6, 3.3, 5.4 times higher 
than general attacks , respectively. In many cases, the success 
rate of guessing the correct PIN is above 10%. The results show 
that known digits attacks are more practical than general attacks . 
Even known digits attacks are applied to attack a single user 
or a small number of users, their success rates are not im- 
practically low. These results also indicate the effectiveness 
of our inter-keystroke timing attacks to 3, 4 or 5-digits PINs 
and that the attacks pose a greater threat to shorter PINs as 
expected. 
6. Discussions 
In this section, we compare our attacks with HMM-based 
attacks to show the merits of our approach. Then, we demon- 
strate that our attacks pose a serious threat to real-world 
applications when applied at large scale. Next, we propose 
several feasible countermeasures to mitigate our attacks. 
Lastly, we discuss the limitations of our attacks. 
6.1. Comparison with HMM-based attacks 
Most keystroke timing attacks in the literature follow a similar 
attacking framework based on a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) 
( Kune and Kim, 2010; Song et al., 2001; Zhang and Wang, 
2009 ). Compared to HMM-based attacks, our attacks have two 
merits. 
The first merit is that our general attacks are user- 
independent. The cognitive model in our attacks captures the 
common characteristics across all skilled users typing PINs 
so that it can be used to attack any target users. In addition, 
the use of cosine similarity in our attacks enables an attacker 
to rank all candidate PINs similarly for inferring a target PIN 
even if different users may type the target PIN with different 
speeds. In comparison, the HMM-based attacks relies on the 
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distribution of inter-keystroke timing for a specific user typing 
each possible key pair so as to calculate the probability of any 
possible underlying keystroke sequence given an observed 
inter-keystroke timing sequence. Because the distribution of 
inter-keystroke timing for different users typing any same 
key pair may not be similar, the HMM-based attacks are 
user-dependent. They require that an HMM be trained with 
the inter-keystroke timing data for all possible key pairs col- 
lected from a target user, and such a model is user-dependent 
and has to be retrained from scratch if the target user 
changes. 
The second merit is that the cognitive model used in our 
attacks can be trained based on inter-keystroke time intervals 
for a small number of key pairs (minimum two key pairs). 
To launch an HMM-based attack, however, an attacker needs 
to collect a sufficiently large number of inter-keystroke time 
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intervals for each possible key pair from a target user before 
launching the attack. For PIN inference, an attacker needs 
to capture 30–50 inter-keystroke time intervals for each of 
110 key pairs (including 10 ×10 digit-to-digit key pairs and 10 
digit-to- < Enter > key pairs) from a target user. It is usually 
difficult for an attacker to collect such large amount of 
data before launching an online attack in practical set- 
tings. Under the adversary model of our attacks, attackers 
cannot collect enough training data to support HMM-based 
attacks. 
6.2. Attack threats to real-world applications 
In general, the success rate of the proposed attacks may 
not be sufficiently high to pose imminent risk to an indi- 
vidual user’s PIN if the attacker does not have prior knowl- 
edge on any digits of the target PIN. However, our attacks 
are practical in online settings because the attacks are user- 
independent and thus can be applied to attack any num- 
ber of users’ PINs on a large scale. To show the threats of 
our attacks to real-world applications, we provide two exam- 
ples where PINs are used as the only credential to protect 
users’ accounts and where attackers can collect many users’ 
inter-keystroke timing data for PIN entries using malicious 
JavaScripts code. 
One example is the Internet banking system of one of 
the largest banks in a Southeast Asia country, whose name 
is anonymized as “XYZ” here. It has more than three mil- 
lion Internet banking users. To log into an Internet bank- 
ing account, a user needs to input a user ID and a 6 to 9- 
digit PIN as the credential (most users choose 6-digit PINs, 
which is the default case). Our tests show that users are not 
blocked within 50 login attempts. Although certain financial 
services (e.g., bank transactions) require a second-factor au- 
thentication, much sensitive information (e.g., account bal- 
ances, usernames, addresses) can be leaked merely after PIN 
authentication. If ten percent of users’ inter-keystroke tim- 
ing data about PIN entries were collected, our online at- 
tacks caould be applied to all these users’ accounts with 50 
tries per account, which would not lead to any account be- 
ing locked in practice. Consequently, On the average, around 
4.16% of users’ accounts would be compromised accord- 
ing to our experimental results. In other words, more than 
12,000 users’ accounts would be compromised due to our 
attacks. 
The other example is one of the largest payment-as-a- 
service (PaaS) platforms in Asia, whose name is anonymized 
as ABCpay here. It has more than 500 million users over the 
world. To make a payment through its service, a user needs 
to input his/her mobile phone number as user ID and a 6-digit 
PIN as password. It is not difficult for attackers to obtain many 
users’ names, mobile phone numbers, and email addresses by 
crawling public web pages. The login attempts of each user’s 
account in this platform is limited to 3. On the average, an at- 
tacker needs to launch online attacks to 83 users’ accounts 
in order to compromise one account. In other words, if our 
attacks were applied to 1/1000 of users’ accounts, then 6,000 
users’ accounts would be compromised on the average. Our 
attacks would cause serious damages in this case since at- 
tackers can transfer money from victims’ accounts to other 
accounts. 
Considering that many financial institutions have a large 
number of users and that malicious JavaScripts code is easy 
to spread, our attacks pose a serious threat to real-world ap- 
plications when applied in large scale. 
6.3. Mitigations 
Increasing PIN length . The security strength of the most existing 
PIN systems is chosen according to the success probability of 
random guessing attacks ( Yan et al., 2012 ). For example, the se- 
curity strength for 6-digit PINs is considered to be 10 −6 . How- 
ever, our study reveals that the inter-keystroke timing attacks 
significantly lower the security strength of PIN systems. A sim- 
ple approach to mitigating this threat is to increase the PIN 
length. Our calculation suggests that users should increase 6- 
digit PINs to 10-digit PINs whose security strength under the 
inter-keystroke timing attacks is higher than that of 6-digit 
PINs under the random guessing attacks on the average. This 
mitigation does not require any change to the hardware of cur- 
rent PIN authentication systems, but at the expense of requir- 
ing users to memorize longer PINs. 
PIN selection policy . As shown in Section 4.3 , the perfor- 
mance of our attacks varies significantly when they apply to 
PINs at different strength levels. If a user selects a 6-digit PIN 
at level 5 instead of level 1 to level 4 , the probability of a suc- 
cessful general attack within 100 attempts can be reduced by 
870, 222, 251, and 43 times, respectively. 
We thus suggest adopting a PIN selection policy where a 
user is required to choose a PIN at level 5 when the user regis- 
ters his/her account. If a user chooses a PIN at level 1 to level 4 , 
his/her registration would not succeed until the user changes 
his/her PIN to level 5. Level 5 consists of 9 ∗10 5 PINs which ac- 
count for 90% of all 6-digit PINs. It is thus relatively easy for a 
user to obtain a PIN at level 5 if he/she simply chooses his/her 
PIN randomly. 
Considering that the success rate of attacking 6-digit PINs 
at level 5 is still around 10 times higher than random guessing 
attacks, To achieve a similar security strength of 6-digit PINs 
under the random guessing attacks, we suggest users choose 
7-digit PINs at the strongest strength level. Note that when the 
PIN selection policy is adopted, it is unnecessary for users to 
choose 10-digit PINs mentioned earlier. 
A new keypad layout . As it is shown in the cognitive model, 
the inter-keystroke timing measurement for a user types a key 
pair on a keypad is mainly determined by the distance be- 
tween the two keys of the key pair on the keypad. Based on this 
observation, we design a new keypad for PIN entry to mitigate 
inter-keystroke timing attacks. As shown in Fig. 9 , the keypad 
is in a circular shape. All 10 digits (0–9) keys are evenly dis- 
tributed on a circle. An < Enter > key is located in the center 
of the keypad. When a user types his/her PIN, the user presses 
< Enter > key after pressing each digit. When submitting the 
PIN, the user may press the < Enter > key twice. During the 
PIN entry, the user always moves his/her finger through the 
same distance for entering any digit, leading to similar inter- 
keystroke timing sequence for entering any PINs. 
Although a user may take double time for entering his/her 
PIN on this new keypad, the security strength of a PIN system 
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is improved significantly against the inter-keystroke timing 
attacks. If this new keypad is adopted, the success rate of inter- 
keystroke timing attacks would be similar to that of random 
guessing attacks. We implement this keypad on a smartphone 
where the distances between any digit key and < Enter > key 
is 1 inch. It takes around 2.5 seconds for a user to enter a 6-digit 
PIN on the new keypad. In comparison, most existing leakage 
resilient password systems which have the same security 
strength as that of 6-digit PINs require hundreds of seconds 
for user authentication (e.g. Asghar et al., 2010; Hopper and 
Blum, 2001; Li and Shum, 2005; Weinshall, 2006 ). 
Leakage resilient password systems (LRPSs) . LRPSs ( Asghar 
et al., 2013; 2010; Bai et al., 2008; Hopper and Blum, 2001; Li 
and Shum, 2005; Weinshall, 2006; Wiedenbeck et al., 2006; 
Yan et al., 2013 ) are user authentication systems that do not 
disclose user credentials to observers. Such systems are by 
design secure against any side-channel attacks including our 
attacks. However, Yan et al. (2012) point out that in order to be 
secure, LRPSs have remarkably low usability. A secure LRPS 
usually takes hundreds of seconds to complete an authentica- 
tion session, which may not be practical in many applications 
( Asghar et al., 2010; Hopper and Blum, 2001; Li and Shum, 2005; 
Weinshall, 2006 ). 
6.4. Limitations 
Ecological validity . In our user study, we recruit students and 
young staff only from a single university. The performance of 
our attacks may vary among different populations. The eco- 
logical validity of our user study is limited, but the qualitative 
facts in our research are likely to remain true. 
Typing styles . In our experiments, we require all participants 
to enter their PINs on a keypad using a single finger. We con- 
ducted a larger-scale survey on user’s typing habits through 
emails and social networks over three weeks. In total, we re- 
ceived 544 responses. The participants of the survey mainly 
came from Singapore, China and the UK. They were not lim- 
ited to the students or staffs in universities. According to the 
survey results, most participants reported that they tend to 
use a single finger when they enter PINs on numeric keypads 
in real life. In particular, 344 participants (63.2%) use one fin- 
ger, 124 participants (22.8%) use two fingers, and 76 partici- 
pants (14.0%) use more than two fingers for PIN entry. In order 
to attack users who use multiple fingers when typing PINs, our 
cognitive model should be extended to cover different typing 
styles. 
Typing error s. During the process of entering PINs in real- 
world scenarios, users may press a wrong digit and then use 
the < Delete > or < Backspace > key to cancel the wrong in- 
put. We exclude this situation because it rarely happens in PIN 
entries. We plan to address this issue and generalize our at- 
tacks for password inference in the future. 
7. Related work 
Besides inter-keystroke timing attacks, many other side- 
channel attacks for keystroke inference have been proposed 
in the literature recently. We summarize three types of side- 
channel attacks, including audio-based attacks, video-based 
attacks, and sensor-based attacks. 
The first type of side-channel attacks for keystroke infer- 
ence is audio-based attack. Asonov and Agrawal (2004) and 
Zhuang et al. (2009) demonstrate that the sounds of hitting 
different keys are different and thus propose machine learn- 
ing algorithms to classify them. However, their approaches are 
user-dependent and keyboard-dependent. In comparison, the 
cognitive model in our attacks can be built for attacking any 
users as long as the geometric measurements of victims’ key- 
pads are known by attackers. 
Different from machine learning based approaches, a 
training-free method is proposed by Berger et al. (2006) . They 
observe that the similarity of two keystroke acoustic signals 
has a negative relationship with the distance between the 
corresponding two keys. They infer English words typed by 
a user according to the relationship patterns of keystroke 
acoustic signals of all words in an English dictionary. In con- 
trast, our approach focuses on PIN inference without making 
any assumption on the similarity of keystroke acoustic sig- 
nals. Another training-free approach ( Tong et al., 2014 ) takes 
full advantage of multiple pairs of microphones to estimate 
keystrokes’ physical positions based on the time differences of 
keystroke acoustic signals arriving at different microphones. 
They require at least two pairs of microphones be placed near 
the users’ keyboards so as to collect acoustic signals of users’ 
keystrokes. In comparison, our attacks make no restriction on 
how to collect users’ inter-keystroke timing data. 
The second type of side-channel attacks for keystroke in- 
ference is video-based attack. Early works ( Backes et al., 2009; 
2008 ) exploit the reflections of screens on glasses, spoons, eyes 
of users to recover the users’ inputs. These attacks require at- 
tackers to acquire videos directly capturing users’ screens or 
screen reflections. Recent works show that even when key- 
boards or screens are not visible from the videos, attack- 
ers can still infer users’ inputs via analyzing users’ fingers 
or hands movements using advanced computer vision algo- 
rithms ( Shukla et al., 2014; Ye et al., 2017; Yue et al., 2014 ). Even 
users’ hands movements are not visible from the videos, Sun 
et al. (2016) analyze the motion patterns of devices backsides 
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caused by the users’ keystrokes on different positions of the 
screens of the users’ devices and classify them using Support 
Vector Machine. All these attacks require attackers to place 
cameras near the users. 
The third type of side-channel attacks for keystroke in- 
ference is sensor-based attack. A range of studies show that 
embedded sensors on mobile devices or wearable devices can 
reveal sensitive information about users’ keystroke behaviors. 
Various embedded sensors are investigated in this context, in- 
cluding accelerometers ( Aviv et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2015; Maiti 
et al., 2016; Marquardt et al., 2011; Owusu et al., 2012; Wang 
et al., 2015 ), gyroscopes ( Cai and Chen, 2011; Miluzzo et al., 
2012; de Souza Faria and Kim, 2013; Xu et al., 2012 ), ambient- 
light sensors ( Spreitzer, 2014 ) and WiFi ( Ali et al., 2015; Li et al., 
2016 ). All these attacks require attackers to hack into mobile 
devices or wearable devices for accessing sensor data or to 
place mobile devices near users’ keyboards. 
8. Conclusion and future work 
In this paper, we proposed user-independent inter-keystroke 
timing attacks on PINs based on a human cognitive model. 
The human cognitive model allows an attacker to build a 
timing dictionary of all possible PINs ranked according to 
the cosine similarity between the observed timing sequence 
of a target PIN and each possible PIN’s predicted timing 
sequence. We examined the effectiveness of our attacks to 
the PINs at different PIN strength levels in different online 
attack settings. The results demonstrated that our attacks 
achieve satisfactory performance. We also suggested several 
countermeasures to mitigate our attacks. 
In the future, we plan to extend our attacks to infer users’ 
passwords. A more complicated human cognitive model is to 
be developed for such purpose. 
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Appendix A. Other cognitive operations 
Apart from the four phenomena described in Section 2.2.2 , we 
investigate other two cognitive operations which may affect 
the inter-keystroke time. 
Phenomenon 5. The execution process is slower for the transition 
from the last digit to the < Enter > key. People usually check the 
PIN before pressing the < Enter > key, which makes the cogni- 
tion time between the last digit and the < Enter > key longer 
than the cognition time between the two keys in other key 
pairs. 
Table A.1 – The significance testing results of cognitive 
model’s parameters. The statistically significant parame- 
ters are marked with  . 
Parameter Coefficient p -value 
Intercept a = 155.08 < 0.001  
I b = 31.60 < 0.001  
E c = 17.63 0.060 
S 1 d = 8.13 0.365 
S 2 e = 7.81 0.429 
S 3 f = 31.80 0.021 
Phenomenon 6. Each character string can be decomposed either 
into syllables or trigrams and bigrams, sometimes even quater- 
grams. People memorize words following this decomposition 
rule. In the processing of typing a string, a cognitive proces- 
sor retrieves each segment of the string and encodes it into 
an ordered list of characters. The motor processor moves the 
finger and presses the key subsequently. The next segment 
of the string is then initiated and executed in the same way. 
Specifically for PIN entry, people often break a long numeric 
code into smaller parts, and by ‘chunking’ long numbers into 
several groups, people can greatly increase the recall accuracy 
and speed. For instance, it is common for people to memorize 
a 6-digit PIN following the ‘xxx-xxx’ pattern which may lead 
to a slight pause after the first three numbers being entered 
( Crook, 2008 ). Sometimes, people use their birthdays to help 
define their PINs, so they memorize the PINs following the 
‘yymmdd/yyddmm’ or ‘mmddyy/ddmmyy’ pattern. In these 
cases, the time between the segment ‘yy’ and ‘mmdd/ddmm’ 
maybe longer. 
Phenomenas 5 and 6 are two cognition operations of the 
typing task. In our paper, we call Phenomenas 4 and 5 the 
word-end effect and the word-segment effect, respectively. We 
estimate the time of each operation as a constant parameter 
from experimental data. 
Incorporated with the cognitive time ( Phenomenas 5 
and 6 ), an extended linear model is used to predict the inter- 
keystroke time for 6-digit PINs: 
T = a + b ∗ I + c ∗ E + d ∗ S 1 + e ∗ S 2 + f ∗ S 3 , (4) 
where the first two terms a + b ∗ I represent Fitts’s Law, E de- 
notes the word-end effect, and S 1 , S 2 , S 3 denote the word- 
segment effect for three mostly-used PIN memorization pat- 
terns (‘xx-xxxx’, ‘xxx-xxx’, ‘xxxx-xx’ for 6-digit PINs), respec- 
tively. E, S 1 , S 2 and S 3 are binary variables which take the value 
1 if the input key pair is in the corresponding position in the 
PIN sequence (i.e., for the last key pair in a PIN sequence, 
E = 1 , otherwise, E = 0 ; for the second, third and forth key pair, 
S 1 , S 2 , S 3 = (1 , 0 , 0) , (0, 1, 0), and (0, 0, 1), respectively, other- 
wise, S 1 , S 2 , S 3 = (0 , 0 , 0) ). The coefficients c, d, e , and f denote 
the added time caused by such effects when they are present. 
To validate this extended model, we conduct a significance 
testing on the coefficients of Eq. 4 . The null hypothesis of each 
coefficient is H 0 : β = 0 ( β refers to c, d, e, f in Eq. (4) , respec- 
tively). The results are given in Table A.1 . 
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The results of significance testing show that the impact of 
word-end effect ( p = 0 . 060 ) and word-segment effects ( p = 
0 . 365 ; 0 . 429 ; 0 . 021 ) are statistically insignificant while the to- 
pographical effect has a significant positive impact on the 
inter-keystroke time ( p < 0.001). One potential reason for the 
insignificant parameters (i.e., word-end and word-segment 
effects) is that typing a 6-digit PIN is a simple behavior 
so that participants may need little cognitive time for the 
PIN entry. Considering that the cognitive time is statistically 
insignificant, we decide to consider the topographical effect 
only in our cognitive model. 
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